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U.S. v. WINDSOR’S IMPACT ON IMMIGRATION LAW 
 
Janet M. Calvo* 
 
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), barred federal immigration 
authorities1 as well as other federal officials from recognizing same-sex 
marriages. Now that DOMA has been declared unconstitutional in U.S. v. 
Windsor,2 the federal officials that implement immigration law have 
declared that same-sex marriages will be recognized to the same extent as 
opposite-sex marriages. This has implications for several aspects of 
immigration law and practice. On July 1, 2013 the Secretary of Homeland 
Security directed the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
“to review immigration visa petitions filed on behalf of a same-sex spouse 
in the same manner as those filed on behalf of an opposite-sex spouse,”3 
                                                
* Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. Since joining the 
CUNY faculty in 1985, she has taught in the areas of immigration, especially the rights of 
undocumented persons, legal access for the poor, healthcare, housing, and education. She 
has written about healthcare access for immigrant women and has made numerous 
presentations about how the law affects immigrants. A former member of the National 
Steering Committee on Battered Immigrant Women and the Advisory Committee of the 
New York State Assembly Task Force on New Americans, she has also been a member of 
the Board of Directors of the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, and a Director of 
the Center for Immigrants’ Rights. 
1 The familiar Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), was disbanded and 
reorganized. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 abolished the INS. Abolishment of INS, 
6 U.S.C.A. § 291, Pub.L. No. 107-296 § 471, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). It initiated a 
governmental reorganization, transferring the majority of the INS functions from the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), but 
leaving the Executive Office of Immigration Review (including the immigration judges and 
Board of Immigration Appeals) under the auspices of the DOJ. The Department of State 
continues to be the agency in charge of determining eligibility of visas through its 
consulates when a non-citizen is not in the United States. 
2 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013). 
3 Statement, Janet Napolitano, Implementation of the Supreme Court Ruling on the 
Defense of Marriage Act (July 1, 2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/07/01/ 
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and the USCIS posted additional information about implementation.4 On 
August 2, the Secretary of State similarly stated “when same-sex spouses 
apply for a visa, the Department of State will consider that application in 
the same manner that it will consider the application of opposite-sex 
spouses,”5 and the Department of State website provided further detail, in 
line with the USCIS position.6 
Further, on July 17, 2013, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
issued a decision7 stating that DOMA was no longer an impediment to 
recognition of same-sex marriages; therefore, a same-sex spouse would be 
recognized under immigration law if the marriage were valid in the state in 
which it was celebrated, and was bona fide.8 This case involved the non-
citizen same-sex spouse of a U. S. citizen who had filed a petition on behalf 
of that spouse. The Director’s determination had found that the marriage 
was valid under the laws of Vermont where the marriage was celebrated, 
but did not grant the petition. The BIA held that, after Windsor, the sole 
remaining issue was whether the marriage was bona fide—i.e., whether the 
marriage was entered into solely for the purposes of immigration—and 
remanded the case to allow the Director to make that determination. 
The administrative material also clarified that as a general matter a 
same-sex marriage would be recognized for immigration purposes if a 
same-sex couple married in a U.S. state or a foreign country that recognizes 
same-sex marriage, but live in a state that does not.9 This follows the 
established approach to recognition of marriages under the immigration 
law. To determine whether a marriage is legally valid, the relevant 
immigration authorities generally assess whether the marriage was valid in 
the place it was performed.10 For example, in Matter of Lovo, the BIA 
                                                                                                                       
statement-secretary-homeland-security-janet-napolitano-implementation-supreme-court. 
4 Same-sex Marriages: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, available at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac 
89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2543215c310af310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vg
nextchannel=2543215c310af310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last updated August 2, 
2013). 
5 John Kerry, Sec’y of State, Announcement on Visa Changes for Same-sex Couples at 
U.S. Embassy London (August 2, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
secretary/remarks/2013/08/212643.htm. 
6 U.S. Visas for Same-Sex Couples: FAQs for Post-Defense of Marriage Act, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/frvi_6036.html 
(last visited September 27, 2013). 
7 Matter of Oleg B. Zeleniak, 26 I. & N. Dec. 158 (BIA 2013). 
8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a). 
9 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, supra note 4; U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau 
of Consular Affairs, supra note 6. 
10 See Matter of Lovo, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 748 (BIA 2005); Matter of Luna, 18 I. & 
N. Dec. 385, 386 (BIA 1983). See also Charles Gordon et al., 3 Immigration Law and 
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determined that a marriage with a transgender spouse would be recognized 
under the immigration law because the couple entered into a valid marriage 
under the laws of the state of North Carolina.11 Other examples include 
common law marriages, customary marriages, and purely religious 
marriages that are considered legal marriages for immigration purposes if 
they are considered legal in the state or country in which they were 
performed.12 
An early commentator expressed concern that there might be an 
exception made to this general approach,13 as immigration authorities have 
occasionally not recognized some marriages that were lawful in the state of 
celebration but not lawful in the state of residence.14 Non-recognition 
occurred in certain limited extreme circumstances that demonstrated a 
strong and enforced public policy against the marriage, such as when the 
state of residence criminally prosecuted couples for cohabitating.15 
However, none of the immigration authorities has raised any similar 
exceptions in the context of same-sex marriages. Further, it would be 
difficult to argue that same-sex marriage is analogous to marriages excepted 
on this basis under current law, since in addition to the holding in Windsor, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a state statute criminalizing same-sex 
intimate behavior violated the Due Process Clause16 and that a state statute 
banning administrative and local anti-discrimination provisions for sexual 
                                                                                                                       
Procedure, § 36.02(2)(a) (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.). 
11 Lovo, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 748. 
12 See Matter of Garcia, 16 I. & N. Dec. 623 (BIA 1978); Matter of Annang, 14 I. & N. 
Dec. 502 (BIA 1973); Matter of Leon, 15 I. & N. Dec. 248 (BIA 1975). 
13 Scott Titshaw, On United States v. Windsor and Immigration Law, ImmigrationProf 
Blog (July 5, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2013/07/guest-blog-
post-scott-tishaw-on-united-states-v-windsor-and-immigration-law.html. 
14 The immigration statute specifically addresses proxy marriages by rejecting them as 
the basis for immigration status unless the marriage has been consummated. 8 U.S.C.A. § 
1101(a)(35). But see 9 Foreign Aff. Manual n.10.1 to 22 C.F.R. § 42.41 (permitting the 
issuance of a visitor’s visa to an alien married by proxy to come to the United States to 
consummate the marriage). The statute indirectly addresses polygamous marriages by 
stating that those who “com[e] to the United States to practice polygamy” are inadmissible. 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (a)(10)(A). However, inadmissibility applies only to those intending to 
practice polygamy in the United States, thereby leaving open the possibility that a person 
who has been polygamous in the past but does not intend to continue polygamy in the U.S. 
could be admissible.  See 9 Foreign Aff. Manual 40.101 N2, available at http://www.state. 
gov/documents/organization/87124.pdf. 
15 For an in depth discussion, see Scott Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: 
Immigration Rules and Their Implications for Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without 
DOMA, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 537 (2010), available at http://works.bepress. 
com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=scott_titshaw. 
16 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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minorities violated the Equal Protection Clause.17 
The administrative materials also addressed the application of post-
Windsor recognition of marriages, which are valid under the laws of the 
state where celebrated, to aspects of the immigration law that involve the 
concept of spouse in addition to petitions for same sex-spouses by U.S. 
citizens. The BIA noted that these include, but are not limited to, fiancé and 
fiancée visas, immigrant visa petitions, refugee and asylee derivative status, 
inadmissibility and waivers of inadmissibility, removability and waivers of 
removability, cancellation of removal, and adjustment of status.18 
The information on the USCIS website further addressed additional 
situations in which the holding in Windsor would apply. Spouses of 
individuals in various non-immigrant statuses such as students and 
exchange visitors can obtain non-immigrant visas that allow them to 
accompany their spouses.19 Further, the child of a person recognized as a 
spouse will be designated as an eligible stepchild if the marriage took place 
before the child was eighteen.20 
However, not all issues related to recognition of same-sex marriages 
have been specifically addressed. For example, there has been no specific 
administrative mention of the recognition of a same-sex spouse’s ability to 
self-petition if there is abuse in the marital relationship or a spouse dies.21 
The ability of a non-citizen spouse to file a petition in situations of abuse or 
death is an exception to the general rule that the qualifying spouse, e.g., the 
U.S. citizen spouse, must file a petition for the non-citizen spouse to obtain 
a visa. However, the general direction that same-sex marriages be treated 
like opposite-sex marriages would afford same-sex spouses the ability to 
                                                
17 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
18 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(K), 1153, 1154, 1157, 1158, 1182, 1227, 1229b, 
and 1255. 
19 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, supra note 6. 
20 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, supra note 4; U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Bureau of Consular Affairs, supra note 6. 
21 8 C.F.R. § 204.2 (b),(c) (2007). Regarding self-petitioning after death of a spouse, 
see U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Widow(er) (2010), http://www.uscis.gov/ 
portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextchannel=3d7fa6c
515083210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextoid=40d9ca07be2e3210VgnVCM100
000082ca60aRCRD; regarding self-petition when there is abuse, see U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, Battered Spouse, Children & Parents (2013), http://www.uscis.gov/ 
portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=b85c3e4d77
d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=b85c3e4d77d73210VgnVCM10
0000082ca60aRCRD; William A. Kandel, Immigration Provisions of the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA) (2012), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/ 
67531/metadc85403. See generally Janet M. Calvo, A Decade of Spouse-Based 
Immigration Laws: Coverture’s Diminishment, But Not Its Demise, 24 NO. ILL. U. L.R. 153 
(2004). 
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self-petition in the same circumstances as opposite-sex spouses. 
Additionally, the practical aspects of implementation may pose some 
special problems for same-sex spouses. For example, immigration 
authorities have certain expectations for couples to demonstrate that the 
marriage is bona fide22 that may be more difficult for same-sex couples to 
meet, such as affidavits from family members acknowledging the 
relationship or evidence of intermingling of finances. Also, there is concern 
about how the Department of State will direct consulates to preserve the 
confidentiality of applications for marriage-based benefits in countries in 
which same-sex relationships are criminalized.23 
The clear and consistent recognition of same-sex marriages by the 
applicable administrative agencies allows non-citizens in same-sex 
marriages to move forward with family reunification, a major objective of 
the immigration law. In practical terms, these executive opinions undermine 
the relevance of divergent views such as the opinion of former White House 
Counsel Alberto Gonzalez and David Strange published in The New York 
Times.24 However, the arguments raised should be addressed, as these 
authors’ reasoning has serious flaws. 
The authors asserted that Windsor affirmed Congressional power to 
legislate marital rights and privileges, noting the majority opinion’s mention 
of a provision in the immigration law barring recognition of a marriage 
entered into for immigration purposes, even if technically valid under state 
law. However, the statute and regulation noted in the opinion are directed at 
fraud, not at who can marry.25 As noted above, the immigration law 
precludes fraud as a basis for immigration by requiring that a marriage be 
bona fide and not entered into solely to obtain an immigration benefit. 
Recognition that the federal government can control fraud does not 
undermine the Windsor opinion’s recognition that marriage and other 
                                                
22 The burden of proof is on the petitioner to demonstrate that the principal purpose of 
the marriage was to make a life together, that the marriage was “in good faith.” Lutwak v. 
United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953). However, a marriage will continue to be recognized as 
valid if it was valid at its inception, but later is no longer viable, as long as the legal 
marriage continues.  Chan v. Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.D.C. 1978); see also 
Dabaghian v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868, 869–70 (9th Cir. 1979); Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 
1201–02 (9th Cir. 1975); Matter of Mowrer, 17 I. & N. Dec. 613, 615 (B.I.A. 1981); 
Austin T. Fragomen et al., Continued Validity of the Marriage: the Viability Issue, 1 
IMMIGR. L. & BUS. § 3:20 (2003). 
23 Victoria Nielson, US Department of State Announces Guidelines for Same-Sex 
Couples, IMMIGRATION EQUALITY (August 2, 2013), http://immigrationequality.org/ 
2013/08/department-of-state-announces-guidelines-for-same-sex-couples/. 
24 See Alberto Gonazalez & David N. Strange, What the Court Didn’t Say, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 17, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/opinion/what-the-
court-didnt-say.html?_r=0. 
25 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a) (2013). 
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family matters are generally within the province of the states, nor its 
holding that a federal law that failed to recognize legally married same-sex 
couples was unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection.26 
The authors also misplace reliance on Adams v. Howerton, a thirty-one-
year old Ninth Circuit opinion.27 In the more than thirty years since the case 
was decided, a growing number of states have passed laws recognizing 
same-sex marriages28 and the Supreme Court has issued decisions that 
precluded the criminalization of same-sex intimate relations or explicit 
discrimination based in sexual orientation29 and the immigration law was 
amended to remove homosexuality as a ground for exclusion.30 However, in 
addition to these developments, the reasoning in Adams v. Howerton was 
flawed at the time it was decided. 
In Adams v. Howerton, the court determined that the immigration statute 
did not recognize same-sex marriages.31 The court acknowledged that the 
statute did not define the term spouse, but did not sufficiently recognize 
that, for immigration purposes, the consistent administrative practice 
determined who was a spouse by the law of the place of marriage 
celebration.32 The court pointed to the statute’s direction to not recognize 
unconsummated proxy marriages as an indication that the immigration 
statute did not contemplate recognition of all state sanctioned marriages.33 
However, this provision was an exception to the general recognition of 
marriage by place of celebration demonstrating that Congress knew how to 
make an exception when it chose to. 
Further, the Ninth Circuit’s statutory interpretation no longer holds 
thirty-one years later. First, the Ninth Circuit turned to a canon of statutory 
construction that, “unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as 
taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”34 To determine the 
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning the court looked to a 1971 
version of Webster’s dictionary that indicated “(t)he term ‘marriage’ 
ordinarily contemplates a relationship between a man and a woman.” 
However, contemporary common meaning is different than forty-two years 
ago in 1971.  The definition of marriage in the current online version of 
                                                
26 See Ruthann Robson, Case Comment: United States v. Windsor, CUNY LAW 
REVIEW: FOOTNOTE FORUM (Sept. 2013), http://www.cunylawreview.org/?p=806. 
27 Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 
(1982). 
28 Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2690. 
29 See Robson, supra note 27. 
30 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(a), 104 Stat. 4978 (1990). 
31 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040–41. 
32 Id. at 1038–39. 
33 Id. at 1039. 
34 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
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Webster’s dictionary includes “the state of being united to a person of the 
same sex” as well as “the state of being united to a person of the opposite 
sex.”35 
Second, the Ninth Circuit pointed to the exclusion statute in effect at the 
time, which in the court’s view expressed an intent to not recognize same-
sex spouses because the statute excluded homosexuals. The court reasoned 
that it was unlikely that Congress intended to give homosexual spouses 
preferential admission treatment while it mandated their exclusion. 
However, Congress amended the exclusion laws in 1990 to remove the 
barrier to admission based on homosexuality,36 thereby removing the 
rationale relied on by the court. Further, at the time Congress removed the 
inadmissibility of homosexuals, it did not choose to define marriage to 
prevent the recognition of same-sex marriages. To date there is no 
definition of spouse or marriage in the immigration law that excludes same-
sex marriage, in contrast to the statute that explicitly precludes recognition 
of unconsummated proxy marriages. Thus, the court’s conclusion that the 
immigration statute precluded recognition of same-sex marriage is 
erroneous. The immigration law now, as in the past, does not define spouse, 
thereby allowing contemporary deferral to the concept of marriage in effect 
at the place of the marriage’s inception. 
After concluding that the immigration law precluded recognition of 
same-sex marriages, the Adams court turned to the question of whether the 
law as so interpreted violated equal protection; the court concluded it did 
not.37 The court asserted that Congressional determinations regarding 
immigration are subject to only limited judicial review and that a 
Congressional preference for “heterosexual” marriages versus 
“homosexual” marriages was constitutionally sufficient. Yet, this is exactly 
the Congressional judgment declared unconstitutional in Windsor. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Windsor was not explicit about the 
level of equal protection scrutiny it applied. However, the Court did hold 
that a legislative purpose to impose inequality was unconstitutional38 and 
that “no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage 
and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect 
in personhood and dignity.”39 Supreme Court cases reflect at the very least 
“a limited judicial responsibility under the Constitution even with respect to 
                                                
35 Marriage Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/marriage. 
36 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(a), 104 Stat. 4978 (1990). 
37 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1041–43. 
38 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–2694. 
39 Id. at 2696. 
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the power of Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens.”40 
Even within the context of immigration law, “individuals within a particular 
group may not be subjected to disparate treatment on criteria wholly 
unrelated to any legitimate governmental interest.”41 Therefore, even with 
limited judicial review in an immigration law context, a legislative purpose 
to express disapproval of same-sex married couples by favoring opposite-
sex marriages while disparaging and disadvantaging same-sex marriages 
cannot pass constitutional standards after Windsor. 
 
* * * 
 
                                                
40 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1977). 
41 Francis v. I.N.S., 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976). 
